Baseball's Economist's posts tagged Craig Kimbrel

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• BCG Growth-Share Matrix of Baseball Players

  October 17, 2011

  The Boston Consulting Group Growth-Share Matrix is a chart used company’s marketing departments to analyze brand marketing, product management, and money allocation towards brands. Typically in this type of analysis a company’s products are segmented into market growth and market share. So I’ve decided to use this matrix as an inspiration in analyzing a teams’ “brands” (players), who make the team money by winning games and filling seats, and by the money teams invest into their “brands”. Thus, instead of using market growth and market share; for baseball, I will use player salary and player performance (WAR).

  The names for each category of the matrix will also be borrowed from the BCG-Matrix. Players with High Salary/High Performance are the “Stars”, who are invested in heavily for their high performance (For example: Albert Pujols, Curtis Granderson, Justin Verlander etc.). Low Salary/High Performance players, who are typically pre-arbitration players whom have blossomed early, are the “Cash Cows” or fuel for the money that can be invested in the “Stars” (Exs. Clayton Kershaw, Alex Avila, etc). High Salary/Low Performance players are the “Dogs” of a team’s payroll, they are invested heavily into, but are not able to achieve what is expected out of that large salary (Exs., Vernon Wells, Adam Dunn, etc.) . Players who make a Low Salary, but do not perform up to “high performance” levels are the ???’s or the potential for the franchise, they could move into a Cash Cow or become a Dog (Exs., Freddie Freeman, Mitch Moreland, etc.).

  The next step is to decipher what is the difference between a high performance and low performance player (brand), and what should be deemed a high salary player and low salary player. The median salary in Major League Baseball is $1.5 million, so players above this figure are “High Salary”, while players below this figure are “Low Salary”. Determining “High Performance” is more difficult. The top 100 position players in baseball in 2011 had a WAR of 2.0 or higher, thus position players with a WAR above this will be deemed “High Performance”, while if their WAR is lower they will fall into the “Low Performance” category. The top 60 starting pitchers in 2011 had a WAR of 2.4 or higher, so again above 2.4 is “High performance”, while below is “Low Performance”. The Top 50 relievers in 2011 had a WAR of 1.0 or higher, thus above 1.0 are “High Performance” relievers, while below 1.0 are “Low Performance”.

  This type of segmentation is a very simple analysis of a roster and payroll, but can be useful for a teams, who may not understand what a player (brand) means to their team as a business (company). I’m sure that the Tigers’ GM understands that Alex Avila gives him the opportunity to spend more on free agents and to keep high-performing veterans around him, but for players who do not necessarily jump out that would be in a particular category it is good to visualize a roster in this fashion. This can be done with any team. I will use the Atlanta Braves’ 2011 roster as an example; because the Braves are the median payroll (15^th highest) in the MLB at 92.2 million dollars (mean payroll around $95 million).

  Now, I’m sure that the Braves Front office understands that Brandon Beachy and Craig Kimbrel give them room to spend, but without looking at this analysis would they consider Jair Jurrjens, a waste of their money? That is a question they should be asking, and many teams should asking after putting their players into these segments.

  

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• The Irony of 2011: Phillies/Cardinals Game 162 and Game 5 of NLDS

  October 08, 2011

  Coming into baseball’s final day, the St. Louis Cardinals and Atlanta Braves were tied in the lead for the N.L. Wild Card, after St. Louis’ dramatic comeback (or Atlanta’s tragic collapse) in September. The Cardinals sent their ace onto the mound, a fellow by the name of Chris Carpenter to the mound against baseball’s worst team the Houston Astros, while the Braves went up against their division rivals the Philadelphia Phillies in a seemingly meaningless game for the Phillies. Yet, the Phillies had something to play for, seeing as if they could get a win against Atlanta, their first round opponent would be the Cardinals, instead of N.L. West division winner Arizona Diamondbacks.

  For those who do not recall what happened on that final day, Chris Carpenter cruised to a completed game shut out victory (which he seems to have a knack for doing lately), while the Braves took a 3-2 lead into the 9^th inning with their stud closer Craig Kimbrel on the mound to shut the door, it seemed inevitable that a playoff would be necessary to decide, the N.L. Wild Card winner. But Kimbrel ended up crumbling, blowing the lead and the Phillies eventually won the contest in 13 innings. Thus, single-handedly the Phillies decided their NLDS opponent.

  After tonight’s conclusion to the 2011 division series, one may wonder if the Phillies are regretting that defeat of Atlanta on the season’s last day. Many people are shocked that the Phillies lost to the Cardinals and did not reach the World Series. And after investing over $170 million into their team and $67 million into just their starting staff, people may have a fair point. However, some people may not have realized how good of a matchup the Phillies were for the Cardinals. First off, the Cardinals won the season series against the Phillies in the regular season. But, that is not the main reason, the main reason is hitting. The Cardinals are the best hitting team in the National League with a team WAR of 34.3 and a team wOBA of .332. The Phillies on the other hand had the worst hitting team of any team to make the playoffs (WAR of 24.1 and wOBA of .316). Their pitching was heads and shoulders above the competition (and when you spend $67 million on five players it should be). However, Chris Carpenter is still very good, with a FIP of 3.06 and WAR of 5.0, he is still an extremely difficult matchup for a team as bad at hitting as the Phillies. Many will point to the fact that Halladay’s numbers are that much better (2.20 FIP, 8.2 WAR), that it should not have been a competition between the two pitchers.

  It is a proven fact, however, that you cannot win a baseball game by 0-0 or merely shutting out the opponent. You have to score runs to win the game, and in Game 5 against the opponent the Phillies put in the playoffs, they could not score runs. Phillies fans have every right to complain about Ryan Howard, because not many people realize that he makes the same amount of money as Mr. Roy Halladay, yes that 0 for 15 string to end the Phillies season, came at a cost of 20 million dollars, or roughly $30,000 per PA, $588k per HR, or $111,111 per strikeout. Money will not buy a championship in baseball, unless it is spent correctly, no matter how much money is spent.

  

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• Craig Kimbrel: The Best Closer in Baseball and Why a Closer Should Never Be Paid Big-Time Money

  August 12, 2011

  How important is the 9^th inning? How important is the pitcher coming out of the bullpen to close out the 9^th inning? Do major league teams overvalue the 9^th inning? Was a 3 year/$37 million dollar contract to Francisco Rodriguez justified after a 62 save season?

  To answer these questions, I will look at the top 10 Major League closers in Saves, as well as, any closer being paid over $10 million outside of the top 10, namely Jonathon Papelbon, Brad Lidge and Francisco Rodriguez (if you could even consider the last two closers). In order to analyze baseball’s best closers I used three factors, VORP, save efficiency, and salary. VORP is the amount of runs saved by the closer over a replacement Triple-A call-up, and safe efficiency is just saves subtracted by blown saves.

  These two factors help show the true value of a closer, because for a pitcher like Jonathon Papelbon, who does not get that many save opportunities, his value is still high because he saves a lot of runs and does not blow many saves (only one this season). Based only on these two statistics the top 10 closers in baseball look like this:

  1. Craig Kimbrel

  2. John Axford

  3. Joel Hanrahan

  4. Jonathon Papelbon

  5. Brian Wilson

  6. Jose Valverde

  7. Heath Bell

  8. Mariano Rivera

  9. Sergio Santos

  10. Leo Nunez

  However, when salary is added into the mix this list changes drastically, because the “game’s best closers” are unbelievably overpaid. Check out the changes…

  1. Craig Kimbrel
  2. John Axford
  3. Sergio Santos
  4. Drew Storen
  5. Jordan Walden
  6. Nefalti Feliz
  7. Joel Hanrahan
  8. Leo Nunez
  9. Chris Perez
  10. Brian Wilson

  The top 6 closers, when salary is included, make under $450k this season, which is why their value is so much higher than the rest. This shows how truly good the Brewers’ John Axford and the Braves’ Craig Kimbrel have been this season, they lead both lists with the best statistics and the best value cause of their low salaries. Kimbrel has been worth over 15 times his contract this season, and Axford trails just behind him, he is worth over 13 times his. The top 6 on this list make a combined 2.5 million dollars this season. That is 1/5 of each of Jonathon Papelbon, Francisco Rodriguez, and Brad Lidge’s 12 million dollar contracts, and less then half of each of Brian Wilson, Jose Valverde, Huston Street, and Heath Bell’s 7 million dollar contracts.

  It seems to have become a trend in baseball for a big market ballclub to sign their closer to about a 12 million dollar a year deal, and for a smaller market ballclub to sign their all-star closer to about a 7 million dollar a year deal. A closer, literally, has to be an all-star, however, to be worth that 7 million dollar deal. The only closers this season that; so far, project to be worth that much this season would only be the top 5 of the original list, based on statistics. Thus, most major league teams overvalue the 9^th inning, and routinely overpay their closers to get their “coveted saves”. To answer the question raised at the beginning of this analysis, K-rod’s huge contract with the Mets after his record setting season was not justified, because it was impossible to expect him to stay on a 62 save-season level, as well as, no closer is worth over 12 million dollars a season, let alone 10 million.

  Thus, major league teams should bring up closers from their farm system that make near negligible salaries, along the lines of Kimbrel, Axford, Storen, Santos, and Walden, and let them grow and close out games until they can either be traded for more valuable pieces just before they reach free agency, or just let them go into free agency. Because when a closer becomes a free agent, their value decreases greatly, a good closer on the market now receives at least 7 million dollar a year deals, that truly are not worth it even for an all-star closer.

  Many so-called experts will say you cannot just throw any guy into the 9^th inning, that there is a specific demeanor about it, and that proven true closers are hard to come by. By this reasoning, overpaying for a Jonathon Papelbon or a Heath Bell is somewhat justified; however, the experts are wrong about this. Year in and year out, new closers pop-up in the majors and some prove themselves and some do not. Those who do, though, become drastically overpaid when it comes time for a contract extension.

  

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